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THE ROOSEVELT COURT: THE LIBERALS
CONQUER (1937-1941) AND DIVIDE (1941-
1946)*
Russell W. Galloway, Jr.**
I. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses voting patterns on the United
States Supreme Court during the October 1936 through 1945
Terms, a period in which the Court was dominated by Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt and the eight Justices he appointed.' The
decade of the Roosevelt Court (1937-1946) was an especially
interesting and important period of Supreme Court history, a
time of revolutionary changes in basic constitutional law.
To set the stage, from roughly 1890 to 1937 the Supreme
Court was usually dominated by conservative Justices who
were opposed to large-scale government intervention in the
day-to-day economic life of the nation. After the 1929 collapse
of the stock market and the onset of the Great Depression,
however, the nation rejected the Court's laissez faire philoso-
phy. Spurred by extreme hardship, the Roosevelt Administra-
tion proposed and Congress adopted a wide-ranging set of
economic reforms involving unprecedented government regu-
lation of the economy.
In the mid-1930's, the Still conservative Supreme Court
declared war on the New Deal. From 1934 through 1936, the
Court issued a series of decisions declaring major New Deal
statutes unconstitutional, often by narrow margins. Appar-
ently, the Court was determined to block the nation's effort to
adopt a government-regulated economy. A constitutional im-
passe was at hand.
© 1983 by Russell W. Galloway, Jr.
* Supreme Court History Project, Publication No. 6.
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1. For a more detailed discussion of this period, see C.H. PRrcHm-r, THE
ROOSEVELT COURT (1948).
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During the October 1935 Term, the Term immediately
preceding the period covered in this article, the Court over-
turned several important New Deal legislative programs. The
following table shows the alignment of Justices at the time.
TABLE 1
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES-OCTOBER 1935 TERM
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Cardozo Hughes McReynolds
Brandeis Butler
Stone Sutherland
Van Devanter
Roberts
At the core of the dominant conservative wing were the "Four
Horsemen," McReynolds, Butler, Sutherland, and Van De-
vanter. Roberts, who is commonly considered a moderate, was
closely aligned with the conservatives during the Term, and
he provided the fifth vote that secured the conservative domi-
nance. Hughes, a moderate, also provided substantial support
for the conservative bloc. Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone com-
prised a cohesive liberal bloc, dissenting together in a small
but significant number of major cases.
In the next few pages, we will examine voting patterns on
the United States Supreme Court during the ensuing
Roosevelt era, a period in which the liberal wing took control
of the Court and then split into its own liberal (activist) and
conservative (restrained) wings. First, we will analyze each
Term as a separate statistical unit. Then we will summarize
the trends that characterized the larger ten-year period.
II. THE VOTING PATTERNS OF THE ROOSEVELT COURT
A. The October 1936 Term
This was the Term in which the "Constitutional Revolu-
tion of 1937" occurred. Without a single change of personnel,
control passed from the conservative wing to the liberal wing.
The stage was set by President Roosevelt's Court-packing
plan. After his landslide victory in the November 1936 elec-
tion, Roosevelt proposed legislation allowing him to appoint
six additional Justices, one for each Justice over the age of
seventy. The proposal was announced on February 5, 1937, in
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the middle of the October 1936 Term.
The Court's response was prompt and vivid. Beginning in
March 1937, the Court issued a series of landmark decisions
upholding economic reform statutes and indicating that it
would no longer attempt to censor economic reform legislation
under a regime of constitutional laissez faire economics. The
most famous decisions, no doubt, were West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish2 and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,s but
the period from March to June 1937 saw other important lib-
eral victories as well, both in economic reform and civil liber-
ties cases.4
Voting data for the October 1936 Term vividly reflect the
Constitutional Revolution of 1937. They show a sharp shift to
the left in the balance of power. Dissent rates on the left
dropped by more than two-thirds. Dissent rates on the right
more than tripled. The conservative Four Horsemen ac-
counted for sixty-three of the eighty-two dissents cast during
the Term. McReynolds cast more dissents (20) than the five
2. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (5-4 decision) (substantive due process; state minimum
wage law for women and minors upheld). Although the conference vote in West Coast
Hotel Co., the first landmark case of the constitutional revolution, took place before
Roosevelt's Court-packing plan was announced, most historians agree that the
Court's change of position was in response to political pressure. Certainly, the Jus-
tices knew that the executive branch was planning a major offensive against the
Court.
3. 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (5-4 decision) (federal commerce power; National Labor
Relations Act upheld).
4. E.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (7-2 decision) (spending power;
tenth amendment; Social Security old-age benefits tax held constitutional); Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (5-4 decision) (spending power; Social Se-
curity unemployment compensation tax held constitutional); Carmichael v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937) (5-4 decision) (equal protection; tax); Senn v.
Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937) (5-4 decision) (labor); Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937) (4-3 decision) (equal protection; tax);
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (5-4 decision) (freedom of speech; solicitation
of Communist Party membership held protected); Highland Farms Dairy, Inc., v. Ag-
new, 300 U.S. 608 (1937) (5-4 decision) (delegation of legislative power); Henneford v.
Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937) (7-2 decision) (dormant commerce clause; tax);
Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing Paper Co., 300 U.S. 324 (1937) (5-4
decision) (due process; gold clauses); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (8-0
decision) (freedom of speech); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936) (5-3 deci-
sion) (criminal procedure; jury bias).
Conservative victories over liberal dissents were few and rather insignificant.
E.g., Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (1937) (5-
4 decision) (equal protection); Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Washington, 300 U.S. 154(1937) (5-4 decision) (substantive due process; equal protection; dormant commerce
clause); Binney v. Long, 299 U.S. 280 (1936) (6-2 decision) (tax).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
most liberal Justices combined (19). Table 2 illustrates the
changing fortunes of the liberal and conservative wings in the
October 1935 and 1936 Terms.
TABLE 2
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1935 & 1936 TERMS
JUSTICE OCT. 1935 OCT. 1936 CHANGE
TERM TERM
LIBERALS
Stone 11.3% 3.2% -8.1%
Cardozo 11.7% 4.0% -7.7%
Brandeis 11.1% 2.8% -8.3%
Average 11.4% 3.4% -8.0%
CONSERVATIVES
Van Devanter 1.4% 7.5% +6.1%
Sutherland 3.5% 9.4% +5.9%
Butler 3.4% 12.2% +8.8%
McReynolds 4.2% 13.4% +9.2%
Average 3.1% 10.6% +7.5%
Closer examination of the voting data confirms that con-
servative dominance was broken in March 1937. During the
early months of the Term, the conservatives were quite con-
tent with the Court's decisions. Seventy-seven of the first
eighty-one decisions during the Term were unanimous. In
contrast, twenty-eight of the last sixty-eight decisions were di-
vided, with the liberals dominant. The Four Horsemen cast
fifty-seven dissents during this string of cases compared to
only thirteen by the other five Justices.
As in the prior Term, McReynolds, Butler, Sutherland,
and Van Devanter comprised one close voting bloc, while
Stone, Cardozo, and Brandeis comprised a second, even closer
bloc. Stone and Cardozo agreed in all ninety-four decisions in
which they both participated. In contrast, they disagreed with
McReynolds and Butler in roughly 20% of the cases.'
5. Despite the vivid bloc alignments, disagreements rates at the Court's ex-
tremes remained in the rather low range that had typified the pre-1937 Court. The 50
and 60% disagreement rates that have characterized the modern Court were still sev-
eral years away.
[Vol. 23494
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TABLE 3
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER
z
W <0 z
LIBERALS
Stone --- 0.0% 2.1% 15.2% 16.0% 20.4% 21.3%
Cardozo ... 2.1% 11.6% 13.4% 16.2% 17.4%
Brandeis 
--- 10.6% 12.5% 15.4% 16.7%
CONSERVATIVES
Van Devanter 1.4% 4.1% 5.4%
Sutherland 
--- 4.1% 5.4%
Butler 4.1%
McReynolds ...
The shift to the left was made possible by the movement
of Hughes and Roberts into close alignment with the liberal
trio, Stone, Cardozo, and Brandeis. Table 4 shows Hughes'
voting pattern during the October 1935 and 1936 Terms.
TABLE 4
HUGHES' DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1935 & 1936
TERMS
OCT. 1935 OCT. 1936JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERALS
Stone 7.9% 2.1% -5.8%
Cardozo 8.4% 2.7% -5.7%
Brandeis 7.7% 2.8% -4.9%
Average 8.0% 2.6% -5.4%
CONSERVATIVES
Van Devanter 5.0% 8.8% +3.8%
Sutherland 7.0% 10.1% +3.1%
Butler 7.0% 13.5% +6.5%
McReynolds 7.7% 14.8% +7.1%
Average 6.7% 11.8% +5.1%
In the October 1935 Term, Hughes was a little right of center;
in the October 1936 Term, he was squarely in the liberal bloc.
Table 5 shows Roberts' voting pattern during the same
two Terms.
1983]
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TABLE 5
ROBERTS' DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1935 & 1936
TERMS
OCT. 1935 OCT. 1936
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERALS
Stone 14.4% 5.4% - 9.0%
Cardozo 14.7% 5.4% - 9.3%
Brandeis 14.1% 2.8% -11.3%
Average 14.4% 4.5% - 9.9%
CONSERVATIVES
Van Devanter 4.3% 10.3% + 6.0%
Sutherland 2.1% 11.6% + 9.5%
Butler 3.5% 15.1% +11.6%
McReynolds 5.6% 16.3% +10.7%
Average 3.9% 13.3% + 9.4%
In the October 1935 Term, Roberts was a consistent member
of the conservative bloc; in the October 1936 Term, he was
closely aligned with the liberals and farthest from the Four
Horsemen.
In summary, control passed to the liberal wing during the
October 1936 Term. This was made possible by a major left-
ward shift in the alignment of Hughes and Roberts. The addi-
tion of these two votes gave the liberal wing a five-four major-
ity. As a result, the liberals' dissent rates dropped
dramatically, and conservatives' dissent rates more than trip-
led. Although Roosevelt's Court-packing proposal was ulti-
mately defeated, the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 was
successful. The power of the conservative bloc was broken.
B. The October 1937 Term
During the October 1936 Term, liberal dominance had
been achieved by political pressure, without any personnel
changes. In the next few years, the old guard began to retire,
and the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 was secured by the
selection of New Dealers to fill their seats. During the October
1937 Term, three personnel changes occurred.
First, Van Devanter resigned effective June 2, 1937.
Roosevelt selected Hugo Lafayette Black, Democratic Senator
from Alabama to replace Van Devanter. Black, the "people's
lawyer" and radical New Dealer, was more liberal than any
[Vol. 23
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other member of the Court.6 The Van Devanter-Black succes-
sion was a major loss for the conservatives and gain for the
already powerful liberals. Black took his seat on October 4,
1937, the first day of the Term.
Second, on December 10, 1937, Cardozo was stricken by
his final illness. His seat remained vacant for the remainder of
the Term. Cardozo had been a member of the Court's liberal
wing since succeeding Holmes in 1933. His absence reduced
the liberal wing by one for the last six months of the Term.
Third, on January 18, 1938, Sutherland resigned. Suther-
land had been the intellectual leader of the conservative wing.
After the loss of Van Devanter and Sutherland, only McReyn-
olds and Butler were left of the once dominant Four Horse-
men. On January 18, 1938, Stanley F. Reed was seated to re-
place Sutherland. Reed was a moderate New Dealer who had
served as Roosevelt's Solicitor General during the crucial
1935-1937 period. Although not as liberal as Black, Reed was
expected to fit comfortably into the Court's left wing.
Voting data for the October 1937 Term reveal a continu-
ing shift of power away from the conservative wing. Dissent
rates of the liberals and moderates sank to the lowest point in
many years. In contrast, dissent rates of the conservatives
rose.
TABLE 6
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1935 - 1937 TERMS
OCT. 1935 OCT. 1936 OCT. 1937
JUSTICE TERM TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERALS
Stone 11.3% 3.2% 2.7% - 8.6%
Brandeis 11.1% 2.8% 0.7% -10.4%
CONSERVATIVES
Butler 3.4% 12.2% 13.8% + 10.4%
Sutherland 3.5% 9.4% 16.4% +12.9%
McReynolds 3.7 % 11.7% 18.4 % + 14.7 %
The Court was dominated by the same coalition of liber-
als and moderates who had taken control during the prior
Term, especially Stone, Brandeis, Hughes, and Roberts.
6. See, e.g., C.H. PRITcHMr, supra note 1, at 35, which states: "Black naturally
fitted into the existing left-wing group, though his location was quickly revealed as
substantially farther to the left than the older justices ......
7. The Court issued several decisions confirming that the liberal doctrine of ju-
19831 497
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Hughes, a moderate who had sided with the liberals in recent
Terms, did not dissent a single time during the October 1937
Term. Brandeis, a long-standing leader of the liberal wing,
dissented only once in 151 cases. McReynolds, Sutherland,
and Butler, in contrast, set new personal dissent records, ac-
counting for nearly 70% of the Court's total dissents (58 out
of 84). The following table shows the cohesion within the con-
trolling group of liberals and moderates and their higher disa-
greement rates with McReynolds on the far right.
TABLE 7
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1937 TERM
JUSTICE STONE BRANDEIS HUGHES ROBERTS McREYNOLDS
STONE --- 2.1% 2.8% 4.9% 21.2%
BRANDEIS --- 0.7% 2.7% 19.2%
HUGHES --- 2.0% 18.9%
ROBERTS I I --- 16.1%
The dominant coalition received strong support in di-
vided cases from Cardozo, Black, and Reed. Cardozo was in
the heart of the liberal bloc during his final months in the fall
of 1937. For example, he agreed with Stone in all forty-four
cases in which they both participated. Black staked out a po-
sition on the far left. He was closest to Cardozo, and, after
Cardozo left the Court, he filed a number of solo dissents es-
pousing liberal positions. Reed was closely aligned with the
dominant center coalition during the period late in the Term
dicial restraint in socio-economic cases was now the prevailing view. E.g., Helvering v.
Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938) (6-2 decision) (intergovernmental tax immunity);
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (6-1 decision) (substantive
due process); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (8-0 decision) (civil pro-
cedure; diversity); Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938) (6-1 deci-
sion) (securities); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S.
177 (1938) (7-0 decision) (dormant commerce clause); United Gas Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Texas, 303 U.S. 123 (1938) (6-2 decision) (substantive due process; rate regulation);
Smyth v. United States, 302 U.S. 329 (1937) (6-3 decision) (legal tender); James v.
Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937) (5-4 decision) (intergovernmental tax im-
munity). The court also issued several decisions indicating a willingness to engage in
liberal activism in civil liberties cases. E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (6-
2 decision) (criminal procedure; waiver of constitutional rights); Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938) (8-0 decision) (freedom of speech; handbills); Nardone v. United
States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (7-2 decision) (criminal procedure; electronic surveil-
lance); but see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (8-1 decision) (criminal pro-
cedure; due process).
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when he began participating in decisions.'
TABLE 8
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1937 TERM
JUSTICE CARDOZO BLACK REED
LIBERALS
Stone 0.0% 8.3% 2.4%
Brandeis 6.1% 7.4% 4.5%
CONSERVATIVES
Butler 26.5% 22.0% 20.5%
McReynolds 28.6% 25.3% 22.7 %
The conservative wing found itself stripped of its former
power, but very cohesive in the face of adversity. From his
position on the far right, McReynolds cast more dissents than
all seven liberals and moderates combined. Sutherland re-
mained true to the conservative position right to the end,
agreeing with McReynolds in all fifty-five cases in which they
both participated. He was also closely aligned with Butler. In
contrast, his disagreement rate with Cardozo was. nearly 30%.
Butler and McReynolds agreed in roughly 95% of the cases.'
In summary, the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 was
cemented during the October 1937 Term by the arrival of
Roosevelt's first two appointees, Black and Reed. The coali-
tion of liberals and moderates who had carried out the revolu-
tion during the prior Term-Cardozo, Stone, Brandeis,
Hughes, and Roberts-controlled the Court once again. Reed
aligned himself with this controlling coalition. Black lined up
on the far left. The formerly powerful conservative wing was
cut in half by the resignations of Van Devanter and Suther-
land. The dissent rates of McReynolds and Butler, the two
remaining conservatives, rose. The following table shows the
balance of power at the end of the Term.
8. Reed participated in approximately 30% of the decisions during the Term.
Black, in contrast, participated in all but two.
9. Roberts, after being closely aligned with the liberals in the prior Term,
shifted back toward the center of the Court, although he was still left of center.
19831 499
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TABLE 9
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES-END OF OCTOBER 1937 TERM
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Black - Roberts" McReynolds
Reed Butler
Stone
Brandeis
Hughes _
Obviously, the liberal wing was in control.
C. The October 1938 Term
By the fall of 1938 important changes were under way in
the political and economic arenas. The world, it seemed, was
at war, and the ominous trend toward global conflict was in-
tensifying. Japanese forces occupied parts of China. Spain was
ravaged by civil war. Mussolini, fresh from success in Ethio-
pia, was bent on further fascist aggression. In September,
Hitler, the most dangerous force of all, demanded the cession
of the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. Meanwhile, the nation's
commitment to domestic socio-economic reform was weaken-
ing. The Fair Labor Standards Act of June 25, 1938, was the
last of the major New Deal reforms. In the 1938 elections, the
Republicans scored significant victories, nearly doubling their
representation in the House and gaining in the Senate as well.
"The country had begun once more, though slowly, to swing
toward conservatism.' 1 2 On the Supreme Court, in contrast,
the pattern was liberal dominance.
Like the prior Term, the October 1938 Term was dis-
rupted by personnel changes. Cardozo died on July 9, 1938,
and his seat remained vacant until January 30, 1939, when Fe-
lix Frankfurter was seated to replace him. Frankfurter had
long been a leading liberal spokesman and had played a major
role as a legislative consultant in developing New Deal policy.
On February 13, 1939, Brandeis resigned. He was replaced on
10. Overall, Hughes was a moderate during his career as Chief Justice, but he
voted with the liberal bloc during the October 1936 and 1937 Terms.
11. Roberts was aligned with the dominant liberal-moderate coalition. See
supra Table 7. But he began to shift back toward the conservative pole, where he was
more comfortable.
12. 2 HOFSTADTER, MILLER & AARON, THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 535 (1959).
500 [Vol. 23
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April 17, 1939, by William 0. Douglas, another liberal and one
of Roosevelt's inner circle of advisors and friends. These two
changes did not alter the balance of power since, in both
cases, one liberal replaced another."'
The swing to the left that characterized the prior two
Terms continued in the October 1938 Term. 4 Dissent rates in
the Court's conservative wing continued to leap upward. Mc-
Reynolds and Butler accounted for nearly 60% of all dissents
cast during the Term. The liberals and moderates, in contrast,
dissented infrequently. Brandeis, for example, did not cast a
single dissent in his last sixty-five cases. The following table
illustrates the pattern of liberal dominance that prevailed
throughout the Term.
TABLE 10
DATA ON DISSENTS-OCTOBER 1938 TERM
DISSENT
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE
LIBERALS
Douglas 18 1 5.6% ---
Black 141 15 10.6% +2.5%
Frankfurter 65 2 3.1% ---
Reed 135 6 4.4% -0.1%
Stone 139 5 3.6% +0.9%
Brandeis 65 0 0.0% -0.7%
CONSERVATIVES
Butler 140 32 22.9% +9.1%
McReynolds 139 34 24.5% +6.1%
13. Frankfurter later became a leader of the Court's conservative wing, record-
ing extremely high disagreement rates with liberal members of the Court, especially
during the late 1950's and early 1960's. See infra Table 41. Douglas, on the other
hand, probably deserves the title of "most liberal Justice" in the entire history of the
Court.
14. Important liberal victories during the Term included: United States v. Rock
Royal Co-Operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939) (5-4 decision) (trade regulation); Hague
v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (5-2 decision) (freedom of speech and assembly); Coleman
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (7-2 decision) (political questions; ratification of a pro-
posed amendment); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (6-2 decision) (race relations;
voting rights); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939) (6-2 decision) (federal commerce
power); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) (6-2 decision) (inter-
governmental tax immunity); Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939)
(4-3 decision) (antitrust); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (6-2
decision) (race relations; segregated schools); and Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134
(1938) (5-3 decision) (substantive due process; tax).
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Frankfurter and Douglas moved squarely into the Court's
liberal wing during their first Term. They agreed with Black
in nearly all cases.15 In contrast, they had much higher disa-
greement rates with McReynolds and Butler.
TABLE 11
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1938 TERM
JUSTICE DOUGLAS BLACK FRANKFURTER BUTLER McREYNOLDS
LIBERALS
Douglas "  ... 0.0% 0.0% 58.8% 64.7%
Black -.. 1.5%11 32.1% 34.5%
Frankfurter --- 29.7% 31.3%
CONSERVATIVES
Butler --- 2.2%
McReynolds --
The most striking patterns appeared near the end of the
Term when the liberal wing won a series of split decisions.
McReynolds and Butler each dissented twelve times in the
last eighteen cases. Frankfurter and Douglas sided with the
liberals in all these cases.
An interesting development during the October 1938
Term was the shift of Roberts and Hughes to the right. Rob-
erts moved back to the right of center after his brief sojourn
in the liberal wing during the prior two Terms. Hughes also
began to move away from the liberals, although less so than
Roberts. He sided with the conservatives in six bloc voting
cases late in the Term. Stone, in contrast, remained much
more closely aligned with the liberal wing. 8
15. Reed was also closely aligned with Douglas, Black, and Frankfurter. See in-
fIra appendix A, Table 3.
16. Douglas participated in only eighteen cases during the Term, so his figures
do not represent anything close to a full-Term disagreement rate.
17. The close alignment of Black and Frankfurter is particularly noteworthy in
light of their later roles as leaders of the liberal and conservative wings respectively.
In the October 1938 Term, they disagreed in only 1 of the 65 cases in which they both
participated.
18. See infra appendix A, Table 3. Note that Stone remained closely aligned
with his old partner Brandeis right up to the end of Brandeis' tenure. The two dis-
agreed in only 2 of the 66 cases in which they participated.
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TABLE 12
DISAGREEMENT RATES - OCTOBER 1938 TERM
JUSTICE HUGHES ROBERTS
LIBERALS
Douglas 33.3% 33.3%
Black 14.3% 18.0%
Frankfurter 10.9% 13.8%
CONSERVATIVES
Butler 19.4% 15.0%
McReynolds 21.0% 15.7%
In summary, the October 1938 Term was the third con-
secutive Term of liberal dominance. The already powerful lib-
eral wing was reinforced when Douglas and Frankfurter
moved into a close alliance with Black in their first Term. In
response, Hughes and Roberts moved to the right, and the
dissent rates of McReynolds and Butler reached new highs.
Overall, the alignment during the Term was as follows:
TABLE 13
AT Tr'd E12vPT' flt TTOml1Tc f
WIJ'.1iraEJll J~ I V I d ~ i -1 A Un I UD11Vrn IWOd -kinm11V
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Douglas Hughes McReynolds
Black Roberts -- Butler
Frankfurter
Reed
Stone
(Brandeis)
D. The October 1939 Term
One personnel change occurred during the Term. Butler
was absent at the start of the Term because of illness, and he
died on November 16, 1939. This depleted the conservative
wing still further, leaving McReynolds as the sole remaining
member of the Four Horsemen. On February 5, 1939, Frank
Murphy, Roosevelt's Attorney General, was seated to replace
Butler. Murphy was one of the most liberal Justices ever to sit
on the Court, so the Butler-Murphy succession was another
major gain for the liberal wing and loss for the conservative
wing. The seating of Murphy brought the number of
Roosevelt appointees up to five, an absolute majority.
The most noteworthy patterns revealed by the voting
1983]
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data for the October 1939 Term were the cohesion and domi-
nance of the Roosevelt bloc. In 133 of the 137 cases decided
during the Term, the five Roosevelt appointees were together
on the winning side. Murphy, Black, and Douglas did not dis-
agree a single time during the Term.
TABLE 14
DISAGREEMENT RATES AMONG THE ROOSEVELT APPOINTEES-
OCTOBER 1939 TERM
JUSTICE MURPHY BLACK DOUGLAS FRANKFURTER REED
MURPHY --- 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 3.5%
BLACK --- 0.0% 1.5% 3.1%
DOUGLAS --- 1.5% 3.9%
FRANKFURTER --- 2.3%
REED
It follows, obviously, that the Roosevelt bloc dominated
the Court during the Term. The swing to the left that charac-
terized the prior three Terms continued. 19 Dissent rates went
down on the left and up on the right. The three most con-
servative Justices cast 82% of the dissents during the Term.
McReynolds cast twice as many dissents as the Court's six
most liberal Justices combined!
19. Important liberal decisions during the Term included: Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (6-3 decision) (labor; antitrust exemption); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (9-0 decision) (freedom of religion); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (5-2 decision) (antitrust); Perkins v.
Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940) (8-1 decision) (standing); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88 (1940) (8-1 decision) (free speech; labor picketing); McGoldrick v. Ber-
wind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940) (5-3 decision) (dormant commerce
clause; tax); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (7-1 decision) (criminal
procedure; wiretapping); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1949) (7-1 decision) (free
speech; handbills).
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TABLE 15
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1938 & 1939 TERMS
JUSTICE OCT. 1938 OCT. 1939 CHANGE
TERM TERM_
LIBERALS
Murphy --- 1.8% ---
Black 10.6% 2.9% -7.7%
Douglas 5.6% 2.9% -2.7%
Frankfurter 3.1% 1.5% -1.6%
Reed 4.4% 0.8% -3.6%
Stone 3.6% 2.2% -1.4%
MODERATES &
CONSERVATIVES
Hughes 3.6% 10.3% +6.7%
Roberts 9.4% 17.0% +7.6%
McReynolds 24.5% 26.7% +2.2%
The fortunes of the conservative wing fell to a new low
during the October 1939 Term. McReynolds' dissent rate con-
tinued the steady climb that had begun in the October 1937
Term, reaching the highest level (26.7%) of any Justice since
the January 1838 Term. Roberts continued his shift to the
right. He had the second most conservative voting record, and
he sided with McReynolds more than with any of the
Roosevelt appointees. Hughes also shifted to the right into a
position near the center of the Court. Stone, in contrast, re-
mained closely aligned with the liberal bloc.2 0
TABLE 16
DISAGREEMENT RATES - OCTOBER 1939 TERM
LIBERALS MODERATES & CONSERVATIVES
MURPHY BLACK DOUGLAS HUGHES ROBERTS McREYNOLDS
STONE 7.0% 5.2% 5.2% 9.7% 16.5% 27.1%
HUGHES 15.8% 13.2% 12.6% --- 6.7% 16.0%
ROBERTS 19.6% 20.0% 19.4% --- 11.8%
In summary, the October 1939 Term was the fourth con-
secutive Term of liberal dominance. The liberal
wing-composed of the five Roosevelt appointees and
20. In one important case, Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940) (8-1 decision) (freedom of religion; compulsory flag salute), Stone was the only
member of the Court to uphold the libertarian position.
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Stone-controlled the Court. McReynolds, the only remaining
member of the arch-conservative Four Horsemen, dissented
more than all six liberals combined. In response to the liberal
dominance, Roberts and Hughes moved to the right and dis-
sented much more frequently than in prior Terms. The liber-
als had attained almost absolute control. The future of the
Court was in their hands.
E. The October 1940 Term
During the October 1940 Term, the shadow of World War
II fell upon the Court. In the spring of 1940, Hitler's Blitz-
krieg had overrun Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries, and
France. The Battle of Britain had begun, and America was
forced to set aside its isolationism and prepare for the life and
death struggle against the Axis. Breaking tradition, America
elected Roosevelt for a third term in November, 1940, al-
though the margin over Wilkie was the closest of FDR's presi-
dential career. America buckled down for the effort to defeat
Hitler. On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor,
and the United States declared war. For the next four years,
the dominant reality was war, and the Court was pushed into
the background.
Voting patterns during the October 1940 Term were
rather similar to those during the prior Term. The six-vote
liberal wing was dominant.' The Roosevelt appointees voted
as a bloc in 150 of the 165 cases decided during the Term,
and, of course, when they stuck together, their five votes con-
trolled the outcome. Moreover, the fortunes of the conserva-
tive wing fell to a new low when McReynolds, the last of the
Four Horsemen, resigned on January 1, 1941."1
The extent of liberal dominance can best be illustrated by
21. Illustrative liberal decisions included: Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236
(1941) (8-0 decision) (substantive due process); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 146 (1941) (5-3 decision) (labor); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941)
(5-3 decision) (criminal procedure; contempt); Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312
U.S. 359 (1941) (5-2 decision) (dormant commerce clause); A. F. of L. v. Swing, 312
U.S. 321 (1941) (6-2 decision) (labor picketing); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S.
219 (1941) (5-2 decision) (antitrust; exemption of labor unions); United States v. F.H.
Darby Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (8-0 decision) (federal commerce power); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (6-3 decision) (federal pre-emption).
22. This was the only personnel change during the Term. McReynolds' seat re-
mained vacant until the end of the Term, so the liberals held a six-to-two edge in
nearly half of the cases.
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comparing the dissent rates of Murphy, Frankfurter, Reed,
and Stone with those of Roberts and Hughes.
TABLE 17
DATA CONCERNING DISSENTS - OCTOBER 1940 TERM
JUSTICE DISSENTS DISSENT RATE
LIBERALS
Murphy 6 3.9%
Frankfurter 2 1.2%
Reed 8 4.9%
Stone 7 4.3%
Average 5.8 3.6%
CONSERVATIVES
Hughes 24 14.8%
Roberts 31 19.7%
Average 27.5 17.2%
Obviously, the dissent rates of the conservatives were much
higher.
Douglas and Black held down the Court's left extreme
and rounded out the liberal bloc. For the third consecutive
Term, they agreed in 100% of the cases in which they both
participated. In an interesting development, which foreshad-
owed major future trends, Douglas and Black began to split
off from the more moderate liberals such as Frankfurter and
Reed. In nine cases, they dissented by themselves to the left."3
The power of the conservative wing continued to erode
for the fifth consecutive Term. With the resignation of Mc-
Reynolds, Roberts took over the far right. Hughes continued
his swing to the right, shifting into close alignment with Mc-
Reynolds and Roberts. In fact, Hughes disagreed with Mc-
Reynolds in only one of the sixty-one cases in which they both
participated. In response to the Court's increasing liberalism,
the dissent rates of Roberts and Hughes continued to climb.
23. Murphy showed signs of joining the Douglas-Black group late in the Term
when he agreed with them in five dissents. In these cases, Frankfurter and Reed
crossed over and gave the conservative wing a majority. See, e.g., Wood v. Lovett, 313
U.S. 362 (1941) (5-3 decision) (contract clause); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299
(1941) (4-3 decision) (race relations; voting rights); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313
U.S. 177 (1941) (4-3 decision) (labor).
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TABLE 18
DISSENT RATES - OCTOBER 1937-1940 TERMS
OCT. 1937 OCT. 1938 OCT. 1939 OCT. 1940
JUSTICE TERM TERM TERM TERM CHANGE
ROBERTS 2.0% 9.4% 17.0% 19.7% +17.7%
HUGHES 0.0% 3.6% 10.3% 14.8% +14.8%
Roberts and Hughes cast more dissents (55) than all six liber-
als (53).
Another development that anticipated future trends was
the beginning of Reed and Stone's movement to the right.
During the October 1940 Term, they were still members of the
liberal wing. They were closest to Frankfurter and also quite
close to Murphy. On the other hand, their disagreement rates
with Douglas and Black rose, while their disagreement rates
with McReynolds fell. The following table shows the change
in Stone's voting pattern.
TABLE 19
STONE'S DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1939 & 1940
TERMS
OCT. 1939 OCT. 1940
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
DOUGLAS 5.2% 12.8% + 7.6%
BLACK 5.2% 12.7% + 7.5%
McREYNOLDS 27.1% 13.1% -14.0%
In summary, the October 1940 Term was the fifth consec-
utive Term of liberal dominance. The six-vote liberal bloc had
two components. The strongest group was a cohesive four-vote
coalition including Murphy, Frankfurter, Reed, and Stone.
Douglas and Black were aligned somewhat farther to the left.
Despite increasing support from Hughes and even Reed and
Stone, the fortunes of the conservative wing continued to de-
cline. McReynolds' resignation left Roberts on the far right,
and his dissent rate climbed. Roberts and Hughes dissented
more than all six liberals.
F. The October 1941 Term
When the Court reconvened in October 1941, several per-
sonnel changes took effect. First, Stone took over as Chief
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Justice, succeeding Hughes, who had resigned on July 1.
Stone had been on the Court since 1925 and was its senior
member. Second, Robert H. Jackson, Roosevelt's brilliant and
acerbic Attorney General, took over the Associate Justice po-
sition vacated by Stone. Third, James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt's
close friend and advisor, took over the position left vacant by
McReynolds' resignation on January 1. Roosevelt now had
seven appointees on the Court.
The general voting configuration that emerged during the
October 1941 Term is shown in the following table.
TABLE 20
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES - OCTOBER 1941 TERM
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Douglas Frankfurter -- Roberts
Black Jackson Stone
Murphy Byrnes
"- Reed
The highest disagreement rates were between Douglas, Black,
and Murphy, on the left, and Roberts and Stone, on the right.
TABLE 21
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1941 TERM
JUSTICE DOUGLAS BLACK MURPHY STONE ROBERTS
LIBERALS
Douglas 2.1% 10.9% 29.9% 36.1%
Black 
--- 6.9% 27.5% 34.3%
Murphy 
--- 20.1% 31.2%
CONSERVATIVES
Stone 14.2%
Roberts I --- _
The period in which Stone was Chief Justice is famous
for its divisiveness, and this pattern was already evident in
Stone's first Term, when the average number of dissents per
case leaped from 0.78 to 1.11, the highest level in many years.
For the first time since the October 1935 Term, dissent
rates on the left were as high as those on the right. There was
an increased flow of liberal dissents by Douglas and Black,
usually with Murphy on board.' In contrast, the Court's most
24. Conservative victories included: Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942) (5-4
decision) (free speech; sale of literature on public streets); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942) (6-3 decision) (criminal procedure; right to counsel); Carpenters & Joiners
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conservative Justice, Roberts, dissented less frequently than
in prior Terms.
TABLE 22
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1939-1941 TERMS
OCT. 1939 OCT. 1940 OCT. 1941
JUSTICE TERM TERM TERM CHANGE
DOUGLAS 2.9% 9.4% 18.8% + 15.9%
BLACK 2.9% 9.3% 14.3% +11.4%
MURPHY 1.8% 3.9% 12.1% +11.3%
ROBERTS 17.0% 19.7% 16.5% - 0.5%
The most interesting development of the Term was the
appearance of a rift among the Roosevelt appointees, who had
previously functioned almost as a solid front. Frankfurter, for
example, parted company with his former close allies, Doug-
las, Black, and Murphy.
TABLE 23
FRANKFURTER'S DISAGREEMENT RATES-
OCTOBER 1939 & 1941 TERMS
OCT. 1939 OCT. 1941
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
DOUGLAS 1.5% 25.5% +24.0%
BLACK 1.5% 23.8% +22.3%
MURPHY 1.8% 18.8% + 17.0%
Reed also moved away from the liberals and into the center of
the Court.2 Byrnes and Jackson lined up between Reed and
Frankfurter, very near the center of the Court. In short, the
October 1941 Term saw the division of Roosevelt's appointees
into a liberal (activist) bloc (Douglas, Black, and Murphy) and
a moderate (restrained) bloc (Frankfurter, Jackson, Byrnes,
Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942) (5-4 decision) (labor); Lisenba
v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941) (7-2 decision) (criminal procedure; coerced confes-
sion). There were also several important liberal decisions, including: Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (9-0 decision) (criminal procedure; sterilization); Glas-
ser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (6-2 decision) (criminal procedure; right to
counsel); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (5-4 decision) (criminal procedure;
contempt); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (9-0 decision) (ban on immi-
gration of indigents into state).
25. Reed was a little closer to Douglas and Black than to Roberts and Stone,
but not much. See infra appendix A, Table 6.
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and Reed).2
Stone continued his swing to the right that had begun in
the prior Term. After fifteen Terms in the liberal wing, he
crossed into the conservative wing during the October 1941
Term.
TABLE 24
STONE'S DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1939 & 1941
TERMS
OCT. 1939 OCT. 1941JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
DOUGLAS 5.2% 29.9% +24.7%
BLACK 5.2% 27.5% +22.3%
MURPHY 7.0% 20.1% +13.1%
ROBERTS 16.5% 14.2% - 2.3%
Stone was closest to Frankfurter and Roberts and farthest
from Douglas and Black. Overall, he was the Court's second
most conservative Justice.
In summary, the October 1941 Term saw major changes
in voting patterns on the Court. The Roosevelt appointees
split into a three-vote liberal bloc (Douglas, Black, and Mur-
phy) and a four-vote moderate bloc (Frankfurter, Jackson,
Byrnes, and Reed). Stone crossed over from the liberal wing
and joined Roberts on the right. The overall result was a mi-
nor shift of power away from the Court's most liberal
members.
G. The October 1942 Term
The Roosevelt appointment occurred in the October 1942
Term. After only one Term on the Court, Byrnes resigned ef-
fective October 3, 1942, the first day of the Term. Wiley B.
Rutledge, Byrnes' replacement, was not sworn in until Febru-
26. Cf. C.H. PRITCHETT, supra note 1, at 39-40, which states:
Some startling changes in judicial divisions occurred (during the Octo-ber 1941 Term] . . . and the Court began to give the appearance of
flying apart in all directions . . . . [L]ooking backward, it is clear that
the 1941-42 term was definitely a turning point for the Roosevelt Court
.... [W]ith seven New Deal appointees this group may have felt a cer-
tain sense of relief from the previous constraint of being only a bare
majority, or less than a majority, of the Court. The battle being won,
they broke ranks.
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ary 15, 1943. As a result, only eight Justices participated in
most of the cases decided during the Term.2 7
The most noteworthy development was the continuing
split of the Roosevelt appointees into two blocs. The liberal
(activist) bloc ineluded the very close Black-Douglas pair,
Murphy on the left extreme, and the newly seated Rutledge,
whose liberal voting pattern is shown in the following table.
TABLE 25
RUTLEDGE'S DISAGREEMENT RATES - OCTOBER 1942
TERM
DISAGREEMENT RATE WITH
JUSTICE RUTLEDGE
LIBERALS
Murphy 18.2%
Black 7.8%
Douglas 7.8%
Average 11.0%
CONSERVATIVES
Stone 30.0%
Frankfurter 27.5%
Roberts 36.7%
Average 31.3%
The seating of Rutledge completed the so-called "Libertarian
Four" (Douglas, Black, Murphy, and Rutledge) and initiated a
six year period in which the liberal-activist bloc was only one
vote shy of a majority.
The moderate (restrained) bloc of Roosevelt appointees
included Frankfurter, Reed, and Jackson. During the October
1942 Term, Frankfurter continued his sharp shift away from
the liberal bloc.
27. Rutledge participated in 51 of the 147 cases decided during the Term, a
sufficient number to gain a rather clear indication of his alignment.
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FRANKFURTER'S
TABLE 26
DISAGREEMENT RATES - OCTOBER
1939 & 1942 TERMS
OCT. 1939 OCT. 1942
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERALS
Murphy 1.8% 29.5% +27.7%
Black 1.5% 29.2% +27.7%
Douglas 1.5% 26.2% +24.7%
CONSERVATIVE
Roberts 18.5% 17.2% - 1.3%
Reed and Jackson were also right of center, agreeing with
Roberts more than with the Libertarian Four.2'
Roberts and Stone, the two pre-Roosevelt holdovers, were
much more closely aligned with the moderates than with the
liberals. Roberts held down the far right for the third consecu-
tive Term. Stone was squarely in the right wing for the second
consecutive Term. Overall, the alignment was as follows:
TABLE 27
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES - OCTOBER 1942 TERM
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Murphy Frankfurter -. Roberts
Black Stone
Douglas Reed --
Rutledge Jackson -
Dissent and disagreement rates continued the upward
trend that characterized Stone's period as Chief Justice. The
average number of dissents per case jumped by more than
10% to 1.25. Disagreement rates of 30% to 35% were com-
mon. The balance of power was evenly divided between the
Court's right and left wings. As the following table shows, the
dissent rates on the left were just a shade higher than on the
right.
28. See infra appendix A, Table 7.
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TABLE 28
DATA CONCERNING DISSENTS - OCTOBER 1942 TERM
JUSTICE DISSENTS DISSENT RATE
LIBERALS
Murphy 25 19.4%
Black 22 15.3%
Douglas 22 15.2%
Average 23.0 16.5%
CONSERVATIVES
& MODERATES
Stone 16 11.0%
Frankfurter 20 13.6%
Roberts 29 20.0%
Average 21.7 14.8%
The liberal-activists were able, in short, to steal enough votes
from the moderate-conservative coalition to maintain approxi-
mate parity in wins and losses.' 9
Close examination of the voting data suggests that the
Term had two rather distinct phases. During the first eighty-
six cases, before Rutledge began to participate, the moderate-
conservative coalition was dominant. Murphy, Black, and
Douglas cast nearly two-thirds of all dissents in those cases.
During the last sixty-one cases, after Rutledge's vote began to
count, the Libertarian Four were dominant. The four liberals
cast less than 30% of all dissents in these cases. Clearly, the
addition of Rutledge shifted the balance of power toward the
liberal-activist pole.
29. In spite of the even balance of power, the Term had a definitely liberal
flavor. Important liberal decisions included: Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S.
118 (1943) (5-3 decision) (denaturalization); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943) (6-3 decision) (first amendment; compulsory pledge of allegiance);
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1943) (6-3 decision) (labor);
United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943) (5-4 decision) (eminent
domain); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (5-4 decision) (free speech;
door to door solicitation); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (5-4 deci-
sion) (free speech; tax on distribution of religious literature); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (7-1 decision) (criminal procedure; federal supervisory
power); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (8-0 decision) (federal commerce
power).
There were also many conservative decisions. E.g., Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943) (9-0 decision) (Japanese curfew); Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S.
371 (1943) (5-3 decision) (tax); NLRB v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 9 (1943)
(5-3 decision) (labor); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942)
(5-3 decision) (criminal procedure; waiver of jury trial).
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To summarize, the October 1942 Term saw a widening of
the schism among the Roosevelt appointees. The Libertarian
Four-Murphy, Black, Douglas, and Rutledge-held down the
left wing. Frankfurter, Reed, and Jackson along with Roberts
and Stone were right of center. Neither wing was dominant.
Dissent and disagreement levels rose once again.
H. The October 1943 Term
The alignment during the October 1943 Term was rough-
ly the same as during the prior Term. 0 The Libertarian Four,
Murphy, Douglas, Black, and Rutledge, occupied the Court's
left wing. The other Roosevelt appointees, Jackson, Reed, and
Frankfurter, joined Stone in the center of the Court. Roberts
held down the right wing, often in splendid isolation."
Dissent and disagreement rates continued to leap upward
to modern Supreme Court records.32 Average dissents per case
jumped from 1.25 to 1.47 per case, a modern record. Roberts'
30.1% dissent rate was the highest since the January 1838
Term. Disagreement rates between Justices at the Court's left
and right extremes surpassed 40% for the first time since the
January 1838 Term, reaching the highest level since the
1790's.
30. No personnel changes occured during the Term.
31. Roberts cast solo dissents in 11 cases.
32. There was heavy bloc-voting during the Term. Liberal victories included:
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (4-3 deci-
sion) (antitrust); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944)(5-4 decision) (patent); Ashcraft v. Tennesee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (6-3 decision)(criminal procedure; coerced confession); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322
U.S. 47 (1944) (6-3 decision) (eleventh amendment); Follett v. Town of McCormick,
321 U.S. 573 (1944) (6-3 decision) (freedom of religion); Switchmen's Union v. Na-
tional Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943) (4-3 decision) (labor); and Roberts v.
United States, 320 U.S. 264 (1943) (6-3 decision) (criminal procedure; sentencing).
Conservative victories included: Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607(1944) (5-4 decision) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596
(1944) (6-3 decision) (criminal procedure; coerced confession); Feldman v. United
States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944) (4-3 decision) (privilege against self-incrimination); Mc-
Leod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944) (5-4 decision) (dormant commerce
clause); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944) (7-2 decision) (privileges and immuni-
ties clause); and Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 476 (1943) (5-4 decision) (Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act).
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TABLE 29
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1943 TERM
JUSTICE MURPHY DOUGLAS BLACK RUTLEDGE ROBERTS
LIBERALS
Murphy 12.7% 12.9% 11.8% 42.5%
Douglas ... 8.7% 16.5% 46.7%
Black ... 15.7% 43.3%
Rutledge ... 35.5%
CONSERVATIVE
Roberts
The four Justices not listed in Table 29 were distributed
between the extremes.8 Frankfurter had the second most con-
servative record for the second straight Term. Stone, Reed,
and Jackson were balanced in the middle between Roberts
and the liberal-activists.
TABLE 30
DISAGREEMENT RATES - OCTOBER 1943 TERM
JUSTICE MURPHY ROBERTS
FRANKFURTER 33.1% 24.4%
STONE 27.2% 30.0%
REED 29.4% 29.3%
JACKSON 30.1% 32.2%
No single bloc of Justices was dominant. The generally
liberal character of the Court becomes clear, however, when
one considers that Roberts, the Court's most conservative
member, dissented nearly twice as often as any other Justice.
Apart from Roberts, the dissents were evenly spread among
the remaining Justices.u The Libertarian Four, for example,
cast seventy-six dissents, while the four moderates cast sev-
enty-four.
To summarize, the Court continued its drift toward disa-
greement and polarization during the October 1943 Term.
Roberts, the Court's most conservative member, set a modern
record for dissents, but otherwise the balance of power was
evenly distributed between the four liberal-activists and the
four moderates. Major cases were few, as is often the situation
during war. 8
33. See infra appendix A, Table 8.
34. See infra appendix B, Table 8.
35. The most famous cases of the Term were probably Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944) (8-1 decision) (race; primary elections); Federal Power Comm'n v.
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I. The October 1944 Term86
An interesting feature of the October 1944 Term was the
unprecedented number of dissents and disagreements among
the Justices. 3 Average dissents per case continued their
steady climb to 1.59, another modern record which was nearly
triple the average at the start of the Roosevelt era. Roberts, in
his final Term on the Court, dissented in 35.9% of the cases,
the highest dissent rate since the 1790's. Black and Roberts
disagreed in 83 of the 151 decisions in which they both partic-
ipated! Their 55 % disagreement rate was the highest since the
August 1793 Term. In fact, all of the Libertarian Four dis-
agreed with Roberts at nearly record levels.
TABLE 31
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1944 TERM
JUSTICE BLACK DOUGLAS RUTLEDGE MURPHY ROBERTS
BLACK --- 11.5% 12.3% 14.2% 55.0%
DOUGLAS 
--- 12.8% 15.2% 47.6%
RUTLEDGE 
--- 12.0% 46.4%
MURPHY I I --- 43.5%
Once again, the remaining four Justices were scattered
between the extremes. Stone took over the second most con-
servative position. Frankfurter continued to lean to the right.
Jackson was very near the Court's statistical center. Reed was
a little left of center.
Hope Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (6-2 decision) (Natural Gas Act); and UnitedStates v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (5-4 decision) (criminal law;, strict and
vicarious liability).
36. No personnel changes occurred during the Term. In November 1944
Roosevelt was elected for a fourth term. On April 12, 1945, he died of a cerebral
hemorrhage, and Harry S. Truman became President.
37. See infra appendix A, Table 9 and appendix B, Table 9. The statistics re-present more than differences of opinion about legal issues. There were strong ani-
mosities on the Court at the time, especially between Black, on the one hand, and
Roberts and Jackson, on the other.
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TABLE 32
DISAGREEMENT RATES - OCTOBER 1944 TERM
LIBERALS CONSERVATIVES
JUSTICE BLACK DOUGLAS STONE ROBERTS
REED 21.4% 16.8% 18.8% 34.6%
JACKSON 27.6% 26.1% 19.3% 32.6%
FRANKFURTER 31.6% 29.9% 14.4% 22.5%
STONE 36.2% 31.3% --- 23.2%
In light of the cohesion of the four-vote liberal-activist
wing and the additional support provided by moderates such
as Reed and Jackson, it is not surprising that the liberal wing
had the edge in the won-lost column. In fact, the average dis-
sent rate of the three most conservative Justices was 50%
higher than that of the three most liberal Justices, as the fol-
lowing table shows.
TABLE 33
R ATF . - flCTORER 19.44 TERM
JUSTICE DISSENTS DISSENT RATE
LIBERALS
Black 28 18.2%
Douglas 23 15.4%
Rutledge 23 14.7%
Average 16.1%
CONSERVATIVES
Frankfurter 25 16.2%
Stone 32 20.8%
Roberts 55 35.9%
Average 24.3%
On the other hand, the lowest dissent rates on the Court be-
longed to the moderates, Reed (10.9%) and Jackson (12.2%),
so the liberal-activists did not dominate the Court. Moreover,
despite the strength of the liberal wing, the Term was rather
dull, and major innovations were few."8
38. The most famous case of the Term was Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944) (6-3 decision) (exclusion of Japanese persons from West Coast). In-
terestingly, Justices Roberts and Jackson joined Murphy in protesting against this
antilibertarian decision, while Black, Douglas, and Rutledge voted with the majority
in upholding the exclusion order. Liberal victories included: Bridges v. Wixon, 326
U.S. 135 (1945) (5-3 decision) (deportation); Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S.
711 (1945) (5-4 decision) (labor); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) (6-3 decision)
'I'T Q 1 'MT
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To summarize, the October 1944 Term witnessed record-
setting levels of dissent and disagreement. The cohesive Lib-
ertarian Four took advantage of support from the moderates
to gain an edge in the won-lost figures, driving Roberts and
Stone, the two most conservative Justices, to their highest dis-
sent rates ever. The Term was statistically the strongest yet
for the liberal-activists.
J. The October 1945 Term
By the fall of 1945, the war was over. On May 4, 1945,
Germany had surrendered. In August, atomic bombs had been
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On September 2, 1945,
Japan had surrendered. Roosevelt was dead, and the nation
turned to the difficult challenges of the post-War years. After
years of making war, the nation and the Supreme Court faced
the challenge of making peace.
Three events altered the panel of Justices that sat during
the October 1945 Term. First, Owen J. Roberts, the Court's
most conservative member, resigned effective July 31, 1945,
and President Harry Truman appointed his old Senate friend,
Harold H. Burton, a Republican, to succeed Roberts. Burton
was sworn in on the first day of the Term. Second, Robert H.
Jackson was absent throughout the Term while serving as
prosecutor at the Nuremberg war trials. Third, Chief Justice
Stone died on April 22, 1946. His seat remained open for the
rest of the Term.
In general, the voting patterns for the Term were nebu-
(labor); Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, VMW, 325 U.S. 161 (1945) (5-4 deci-
sion) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (5-4
decision) (conspiracy to violate civil rights); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 581 (1945) (5-4 decision) (administrative law); Georgia v.Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (5-4 decision) (antitrust); Otis & Co. v.
SEC, 323 U.S. 624 (1945) (5-3 decision) (securities); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516(1945) (5-4 decision) (freedom of speech; "preferred position" of first amendment
rights); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (9-0 decision) (detention of Japanese
persons excluded from West Coast); and Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944) (9-0 decision) (race relations; labor).
Conservative victories during the Term included: In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561(1945) (5-4 decision) (freedom of religion); International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelt
Workers v. Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co., 325 U.S. 335 (1945) (5-4 decision)(labor); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (6-3 decision) (full faith and
credit); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945) (5-4 decision) (Federal Employers' Lia-bility Act); and Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945) (4-2 deci-
sion) (antitrust).
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lous. Roberts' departure eliminated the last of the pre-
Roosevelt conservative wing. The Court's new "right" wing
was occupied by such liberals and moderates as Stone, Frank-
furter; and Reed and even Burton had once been reform
mayor of Cleveland during the depression. For the time being,
this was a Court without conservatives.
If one works at it-and anticipates future trends a lit-
tle-one can identify latent blocs. 9 The Libertarian Four
leaned slightly to the left. The other four-the "less liberals":
Frankfurter, Burton, Stone, and Reed-leaned slightly to the
right. But the pattern is weak. Rutledge, for example, dis-
agreed with the "liberal" Douglas more than with the "con-
servative" Frankfurter.
Theie were no tight blocs during the Term. Disagreement
rates among the Libertarian Four were quite high, hovering
around twenty percent. Even Black and Douglas disagreed in
one-sixth of the cases. Similarly, the forces on the right were
dispersed. Frankfurter, for example, had disagreement rates
above 20% with Burton, Stone, and Reed. The closest group
on the Court were Burton, Stone, and Reed.
As expected, Burton was one of the Court's less liberal
members during his first Term. He disagreed with Douglas
and Rutledge, the Court's most liberal members, more than
with Reed, Stone, and Frankfurter.
TABLE 34
BURTON'S DISAGREEMENT RATES - OCTOBER 1945
TERM
DISAGREEMENT RATE WITH
JUSTICE BURTON
LIBERALS
Douglas 29.8%
Rutledge 30.6%
CONSERVATIVES
Stone 13.3%
Frankfurter 24.2%
But Burton's voting pattern was much more moderate than
Roberts' record during the prior Term.
Stone finished his great career on the Court in the right
39. See infra appendix A, Table 10.
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wing, closest to Reed and Burton and farthest from Douglas
and Rutledge.
TABLE 35
STONE'S DISAGREEMENT RATES - OCTOBER 1945 TERM
DISAGREEMENT RATE WITH
JUSTICE STONE
LIBERALS
Douglas 33.3%
Rutledge 26.5%
CONSERVATIVES
Reed 10.4%
Burton 13.3%
Neither the liberals nor the "less liberals" were dominant.
Dissents were distributed rather evenly across the spectrum of
Justices. The Libertarian Four held a slight edge, but it was
very thin, as the following table shows.
TABLE 36DISSENT RATES - OCTOBER
JUSTICE DISSENTS DISSENT RATE
LIBERALS
Douglas 22 16.7%
Rutledge 21 15.7%
Black 16 12.1%
Murphy 12 9.2%
Average 17.8 13.4%
CONSERVATIVES
Reed 14 10.7%
Stone 14 14.3%
Burton 21 15.7%
Frankfurter 29 22.0%
Average 19.5 15.8%
After five consecutive increases, the average dissent rate
finally fell off from the record 1.59 dissents per case in the
prior Term to 1.31 dissents per case in the October 1945
Term.
In summary, the voting patterns on the Supreme Court
during the October 1945 Term were nebulous and diffuse.
Voting blocs were almost non-existent. Control was evenly
distributed among the eight liberals and moderates. The over-
1983]
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all impression is that of a Court hesitating at the end of a long
swing to the left and making ready for a pull back to a more
moderate posture.40
III. TRENDS ON THE ROOSEVELT COURT
A. Voting Patterns
The Roosevelt Court began with the Constitutional
Revolution of 1937, in which the balance of power shifted
from the conservative to the liberal wing. This revolution took
place during the October 1936 Term and was initially carried
out without a single change of personnel. Thereafter the
revolution was cemented into place when Roosevelt reconsti-
tuted the Court by appointing eight new Justices. The follow-
ing table shows that the liberals dissented much less than the
conservatives in the aftermath of the revolution in sharp con-
trast to the conservative dominance in the October 1935
Term.
TABLE 37
DISSENT RATES - OCTOBER 1935-1939 TERMS
OCT. 1935 OCT. 1936-1939
JUSTICE TERM TERM
PRE-FDR LIBERALS
Cardozo 11.7% 5.1%
Brandeis 11.3% 1.4%
Stone 11.1% 2.9%
FDR APPOINTEES
Black --- 7.2%.
Douglas --- 3.2%
Murphy --- 1.8%
Frankfurter --- 2.0%
Reed --- 2.9%
CONSERVATIVES
Butler 3.4% 16.1%
McReynolds 4.2% 20.4%
40. A number of interesting cases were decided during the Term. E.g., Pinker-
ton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (criminal law; conspiracy); Colegrove v.
Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (legislative districts); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328
U.S. 408 (1946) (dormant commerce clause); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946)
(race relations); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (free speech/fair trial);
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (eminent domain); Duncan v.
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (court martial); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)
(court martial); Marsh v. Alabama, 236 U.S. 501 (1946) (free speech).
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The Constitutional Revolution of 1937 was initially car-
ried out by a coalition of five Justices, including three liberals
(Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone), one moderate (Hughes), and
one renegade conservative (Roberts). During the October 1936
and 1937 Terms, these Justices voted almost as a unit, as is
clear from the following table.
TABLE 38
AGREEMENT RATES - OCTOBER 1936-1937 TERMS
JUSTICE CARDOZO BRANDEIS STONE HUGHES ROBERTS
CARDOZO 
--- 96.9% 100% 95.9% 92.8%
187/193 141/141 188/196 181/195
BRANDEIS 
--- 97.9% 98.3% 97.2%
234/239 286/291 282/290
STONE 
--- 97.5% 94.9%
232/238 223/235
HUGHES 
--- 96.9%
285/294
ROBERTS 
---
_I
Roosevelt's appointees made their first appearance during
the October 1937 Term and already had an absolute majority
of five votes by the October 1939 Term. During these three
Terms, they were very cohesive. Black and Douglas, for exam-
ple, did not disagree in a single case during the first three
Terms in which they were both on the Court. They agreed in
335 cases before recording their first disagreement in the Oc-
tober 1941 Term. Of course, the extent of the liberal partner-
ship of Black and Douglas is well known. It is perhaps more
surprising that Black and Frankfurter, the leaders of the
Court's competing wings in the 1950's, agreed in 199 out of
the 202 cases in which both participated during their first two
Terms together on the Court. The following table shows the
close agreement among the Roosevelt appointees during these
early years.
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TABLE 39
AGREEMENT RATES AMONG ROOSEVELT APPOINTEES - OCTOBER
1937-1939 TERMS
JUSTICE MURPHY BLACK DOUGLAS FRANKFURTER REED
MURPHY --- 100% 100% 98.2% 96.5%
57/57 56/56 56/57 55/57
BLACK --- 100% 98.5% 94.5%
154/154 199/202 291/308
DOUGLAS --- 98.7% 95.9%152/154 140/146
KWTER --- 97.4%188/193
Analysis of the voting data reveals that the Justices ap-
pointed by Roosevelt were more liberal than the remaining
Justices appointed by earlier Presidents. The Four Horsemen,
of course, remained conservative until the end of their ten-
ures. Roberts, the key swing vote during the Constitutional
Revolution of 1937, moved back to the right as early as the
October 1938 Term and held down the far right position from
the October 1940 Term to the end of his tenure. Hughes, a
moderate, moved sharply to the right in the October 1939 and
1940 Terms and ended his tenure in close alignment with Mc-
Reynolds and Roberts. Even Stone, a leader of the liberal
wing since 1926, crossed over into the right wing beginning in
the October 1941 Term. He had the second most conservative
voting record on the Court in the October 1941 and 1944
Terms. The following table illustrates these trends by showing
the increasing disagreement between Black on the left and
Roberts, Hughes, and Stone.
TABLE 40
BLACK'S DISAGREEMENT RATES - OCTOBER 1937, 1940
& 1944 TERMS
OCT. 1937 OCT. 1940 OCT. 1944
JUSTICE TERM TERM TERM
ROBERTS 9.5% 25.3% 55.0%
HUGHES 8.2% 22.5%
STONE 8.3% 12.7% 36.2%
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After the Roosevelt appointees attained a clear majority,
they broke ranks, and new alignments began to emerge. The
formerly cohesive Roosevelt bloc split into a liberal-activist
wing and a more restrained moderate wing. This pattern was
especially apparent during the October 1941 through 1944
Terms. At first, the liberal wing included Douglas, Black, and
Murphy. The moderate wing included Frankfurter, Jackson,
and Reed.4 Stone tended to side with the moderates, and
Roberts, the other pre-Roosevelt holdover, was off by himself
on the far right. When Rutledge was seated in February 1943,
he joined the liberal-activist wing. In October 1945, Burtonjoined the moderate wing. Stone's death in April 1946 left the
Court's balance of power hanging between the two four-vote
wings.
The split of the Roosevelt bloc into two wings can best be
illustrated by tracing Frankfurter's movement away from
Douglas, Black, and Murphy. In the October 1939 Term, those
four Justices agreed in nearly all cases. Only four Terms later,
Frankfurter disagreed with the other three in nearly one-third
of the cases.
TABLE 41
FRANKFURTER'S DISAGREEMENT RATES - OCTOBER 1939-1943 TERMS
JUSTICE OCT. 1939 OCT. 1940 OCT. 1941 OCT. 1942 OCT. 1943
DOUGLAS 1.5% 8.1% 25.5% 26.2% 31.8%
BLACK 1.5% 8.0% 23.8% 29.2% 29.1%
MURPHY 1.8% 3.9% 18.8% 29.5% 33.1%
A similar pattern was present in Reed's voting, as the fol-
lowing table shows.
TABLE 42
REED'S DISAGREEMENT RATES - OCTOBER 1939 & 1943
TERMS
OCT. 1939 OCT. 1943JUSTICE TERM TERM
DOUGLAS 3.9% 23.4%
BLACK 3.1% 24.6%
MURPHY 3.5% 29.4%
41. Byrnes was also aligned with this group, but his tenure on the Court was
only one Term.
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The seating of Rutledge during the October 1942 Term
brought the string of Roosevelt appointments to an end. The
following table lists the changes in Court personnel during
Roosevelt's presidency.
TABLE 43
THE ROOSEVELT APPOINTMENTS
Van Devanter - Black
Sutherland -- Reed
Cardozo - Frankfurter
Brandeis - Douglas
Butler - Murphy
Hughes - Jackson
McReynolds - Byrnes - Rutledge
The effect of these appointments on the Court's alignment
was drastic. In economic cases, the Court moved from a 5-1-3
conservative majority to an 8-1 liberal majority.
Obviously, the overall trend during the years of the
Roosevelt Court was toward greater liberalism. This trend ar-
guably reached its peak in the October 1944 Term, when the
Libertarian Four gained the edge in the won-lost column and
Owen Roberts dissented in 35.9% of the cases and disagreed
with Hugo Black in 55% of the cases.
Dissent and disagreement rates rose sharply during the
years of the Roosevelt Court. Average dissents per case rose
from .53 in the October 1935 Term to 1.59 in the October 1944
Term. In the October 1935 Term, the highest disagreement
rate on the Court was 16%. In the October 1944 Term, there
were four disagreement rates above 40%, the one disagree-
ment rate of 55% was recorded. The fact that unprecedented
levels of disagreement appeared on a Court having eight mem-
bers who owed their seats to the same President is an often
noted irony of Supreme Court history.
B. Substantive Legal Trends
During the 1937-1946 period, the United States Supreme
Court was a liberal Court, much more liberal than its prede-
cessors. The Roosevelt Court's comparative liberalism was es-
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pecially evident in economic cases and civil liberties cases.
In cases involving essentially economic interests, the
Roosevelt Court carried out its most famous constitutional
revolution, rejecting the conservative activism that had been
dominant since the 1890's. The gist of the revolution was that
the Court almost ceased declaring economic reform legislation
unconstitutional, adopting instead the deferential stance long
advocated by the liberals, Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and Car-
dozo. The doctrine of substantive due process in economic
cases and the related doctrine of liberty of contract were vir-
tually eliminated.4 The commerce clause was invested once
again with the broad sweep that Chief Justice Marshall had
established more than a century earlier.43 Other federal pow-
ers were given a similarly broad interpretation." The notion
that the tenth amendment restricts the federal government by
reserving large areas for exclusive state control was rejected."
The doctrine of unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power was discarded."
The Court's deferential attitude toward economic legisla-
tion was applied not only to the federal government but to the
states as well. The elimination of the substantive due process/
liberty of contract doctrine freed the states from far-reaching
restraints4 as did the softening of dormant commerce clause
restrictions.' In short, the Roosevelt Court withdrew from its
role as constitutional censor of socio-economic legislation, and
adopted instead the posture of judicial restraint characteristic
of Holmesian liberalism.
42. See, e.g., State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Olsen v. Ne-
braska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); Driscoll v.
Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104 (1939); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937).
43. See, e.g., American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946); Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. F.H. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S.
100 (1941); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
44. See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (taxing and spending
power); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (taxing and spending
power).
45. See, e.g., United States v. F.H. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
46. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); H.P. Hood & Sons v.
United States, 307 U.S. 588 (1939).
47. See cases cited supra note 40.
48. See, e.g., Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941); McGoldrick
v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940); South Carolina Highway
Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
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But the economic liberalism of the Roosevelt Court went
far beyond the bare bones of the Constitutional Revolution of
1937. Granted that the Court would no longer declare socio-
economic reform legislation unconstitutional, there still re-
mained the vastly important task of construing and enforcing
the sweeping statutes characteristic of the age of big govern-
ment. Here the Roosevelt Court showed its liberalism by tak-
ing the position that these statutes were to be liberally con-
strued. Again and again, the Court insisted upon vigorous
enforcement of reform legislation. This position was perhaps
most evident in labor cases,49 leading Corwin to conclude in
1941, "Constitutional law has always a central interest to
guard. Today it appears to be that of organized labor."5 0 The
Court generally gave vigorous support to legislative and exec-
utive programs of business and trade regulation."
The Roosevelt Court also adopted a more liberal posture
than its predecessors in civil liberties cases. In this area, the
Court rejected the hands-off approach that characterized its
economic cases. Adopting an explicit double standard,52 the
Court took an activist role in civil liberties cases, employing
judicial review agressively to nullify governmental action
which did not conform to its libertarian policies.
The libertarian posture of the Roosevelt Court was per-
haps most evident in first amendment cases. By the early
1940's, the doctrine that first amendment freedoms have a
"preferred position" in our constitutional system had ob-
49. See, e.g., Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946);
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516 (1945); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Kirchbaum v. Wall-
ing, 316 U.S. 517 (1942); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940);
NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Co., 309 U.S. 206 (1940).
50. E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY Viii (1946).
51. See, e.g., Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945) (Administrator, Fair
Labor Standards Act); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591
(1944) (FPC); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (FCC);
Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942) (FPC); Gray
v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941) (Bituminous Coal Division); United States v. Morgan,
313 U.S. 409 (1941) (Secretary of Agriculture). See C.H. PRITCHETr, supra note 1, at
167-97, which discusses "[t]he generally favorable attitude of the Roosevelt Court to-
ward administrative legislation." Id. at 168.
52. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938).
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tained majority support.53 In a series of famous cases, the
Court reinforced the freedoms of speech, press, and religion.
The Jehovah's Witnesses won a series of victories, overthrow-
ing the compulsory flag salute,"' license taxes for the distribu-
tion of religious literature,55 bans on the distribution of hand-
bills," bans on the distribution of literature in company
towns, 7 and other similar restrictions.5 The Court reinforced
freedom of the press by increasing the protection for pub-
lished comments on judicial proceedings 9 and by restricting
the power of the Post Office Department to censor publica-
tions by denying second-class mailing privileges.6 0 The Court
also protected the first amendment rights of unpopular radical
groups against government suppression. 1
With several noteworthy exceptions such as the Japanese
relocation cases,62 the Roosevelt Court played an important
role in the maintenance of civil liberties during World War II.
The Court rejected efforts to punish individuals for issuing
publications protected by the first amendment.63 It insisted
upon full compliance with the restrictions of the treason
clause.6 4 It overturned conspiracy to resist the draft convic-
tions based on insufficient evidence. 5 It prohibited denatural-
ization in the absence of "clear, unequivocal, and convincing
53. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
54. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overrul-
ing Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)).
55. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (overruling Jones v. Opeleika,
316 U.S. 584 (1942)).
56. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
57. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
58. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (first case incorporat-
ing freedom of religion into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment);
Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
59. See, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (no contempt unless publica-
tion creates clear and present danger of obstruction of justice); Pennekamp v. Flor-
ida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (same); Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 314 U.S. 252
(1941) (same).
60. See, e.g., Hennegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (bill of attainder);
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (deportation).
62. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (evacuation);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (curfew). But see Ex parte Endo,
323 U.S. 283 (1944) (detention).
63. Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944).
64. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
65. Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478 (1945).
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evidence. 'as On this basis, Pritchett concluded in 1948:
The strong bias of the Roosevelt Court toward the main-
tenance of civil liberties was responsible to a large degree
for the serious and on the whole successful effort made to
prevent the development of intolerance and witch-hunts
during World War II on the scale which had marred
American participation in the preceding war.6
7
The Roosevelt Court engaged in some libertarian activism
in race discrimination cases, continuing the pattern that had
emerged in the prior decades. The Court invalidated the white
primary system, which had denied effective voting rights to
blacks." It took the first, halting steps toward the eradication
of segregation, using the dormant commerce clause to nullify a
state statute requiring segregated seating on public motor car-
riers.6" It reversed convictions where blacks had been ex-
cluded from grand and petit juries.70 It resurrected two re-
maining provisions of the Reconstruction Era Civil Rights
Acts.71 On the whole, however, the efforts of the Roosevelt
Court to resist the blight of racial discrimination were weak
and ineffective.
The record of the Roosevelt Court in criminal procedure
cases was mixed. In cases involving the application of the Bill
of Rights to federal criminal trials, the Court showed some
characteristic liberal activism.72 Similarly, the Court made oc-
casional reforms by using its supervisory power over federal
criminal procedure.7 8 Moreover, the Court put some bite into
66. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 118 (1943).
67. C.H. PRITCHETT, supra note 1, at 117 (1948).
68. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
69. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
70. See, e.g., Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128
(1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939). But see Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398
(1945) (intentional limit of one black on grand jury upheld).
71. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Clas-
sic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
72. The Roosevelt Court is clearly a Bill of Rights court .... The values
enshrined in these provisions are closely related to the freedoms of the
First Amendment, and the Roosevelt Court has to a considerable degree
exhibited the same kind of concern for protection of the procedural
rights of defendants in criminal cases that it has shown for the protec-
tion of civil liberties.
C.H. PRITCHETT, supra note 1, at 137. On the other hand, restrictive interpretation of
Bill of Rights provisions were also adopted in a number of cases.
73. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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the due process requirement that state criminal prosecutions
comply with standards of fundamental fairness.7" On the
other hand, the Court rejected the contention voiced by
Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge that the fourteenth
amendment makes the Bill of Rights applicable to the states
and thus declined to engage in the liberal activist criminal
procedure revolution later carried out by the Warren Court.7 '
IV. CONCLUSION
The Roosevelt Court came into existence in March, 1937
in response to Roosevelt's Court-packing scheme. From that
time until the end of the October 1945 Term, the Court was
dominated by relatively liberal Justices. As conservatives were
replaced by liberal and moderate New Dealers, the Court be-
came more liberal than at any other time in its entire history.
Once they gained control of the Court, the Roosevelt appoin-
tees split into two wings, with the liberal-activists and the
more moderate advocates of judicial restraint vying for con-
trol. By the October 1942 Term, the Court had four liberal-
activists, four moderates, and only one conservative. The
Court's liberalism was evident across a broad spectrum of
cases involving socio-economic issues, first amendment rights,
war-time civil liberties, racial discrimination, and criminal
procedure.
74. See, e.g., Rice v. Olsen, 324 U.S. 786 (1945) (right to counsel); Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1943) (coerced confession). But cf. Foster v. Illinois, 332
U.S. 134 (1947) (right to counsel).
75. See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 1
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DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1936 TERM
CA~ 9: .
Stone %b 0.0 2.1 2.1 5.4 15.2 16.0 20.4 21.3#c 0/94 2/94 2/94 -5/92 14/92 15/94 19/93 20/94
Cardozo % 2.1 2.7 5.4 11.6 13.4 16.2 17.4
# 3/144 4/149 8/147 /147 20/149 24/148 26/149
Brandeis % 2.8 2.8 10.6 12.5 15.4 16.7
# 4/144 4/142 15/142 18/144 22/143 24/144
Hughes % 4.1 8.8 10.1 13.5 14.8
# 6/147 13/147 15/149 20/148 22/149
Roberts % 10.3 11.6 15.1 16.3
# 15/145 17/147 22/146 24/147
Van Devanter % 1.4 4.1 5.4
# 2/147 6/146 8/147
Sutherland % 4.1 5.4
# 6/148 8/149
Butler % 4.1
# 6/148
McReynolds %
a Total number of cases in which Justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both Justices participated
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TABLE 2
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1937 TERM
Cardozo %b 4.3 --- 0.0 6.1 8.5 12.5 26.5 28.3 28.6
#c 2/48 0/0 0/47 3/49 4/47 6/48 13/49 13/46 14/49
Black % 9.3 8.3 7.4 8.2 9.5 22.0 20.8 25.3
# 4/43 12/144 11/149 12/146 14/147 33/150 11/53 38/150
Reed % 2.4 4.5 4.7 4.7 20.5 --- 22.7
# 1/41 2/44 2/43 2/43 9/44 0/0 10/44
Stone % 2.1 2.8 4.9 16.4 24.5 21.2
# 3/145 4/144 7/143 24/146 13/53 31/146
Brandeis % 0.7 2.7 14.6 18.5 19.2
# 1/147 4/148 22/151 10/54 29/151
Hughes % 2.0 14.2 17.3 18.9
# 3/147 21/148 9/52 28/148
Roberts % 12.8 11.1 16.1
# 19/149 6/54 24/149
Butler % 5.5 5.9
# 3/55 9/52
Sutherland % 0.0
# 0/55
McReynolds %
#
a Total number of cases in which Justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both Justices participated
TABLE 3
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1938 TERM
Douglas %b 0.0 0.0 5.9 11.8 ... 33.3 33.3 58.8 64.7
#C 0/18 0/18 1/17 2/17 0/0 6/18 6/18 10/17 11/17
Black % 1.5 6.7 10.8 10.6 14.3 18.0 32.1 34.5
# 1/65 9/135 15/139 7/66 20/140 23/128 45/140 48/139
Frankfurter % 3.2 4.8 --- 10.9 13.8 29.7 31.3
# 2/63 3/63 0/0 7/64 9/65 19/64 20/64
Reed % 6.8 4.8 8.2 11.5 26.1 27.8
# 9/133 3/62 11/134 14/122 35/134 37/133
Stone % 3.0 4.3 13.5 23.0 24.8
# 1 1 2/66 1 6/138 17/126 32/139 34/137
Brandeis % 0.0 7.7 18.2 20.0
# 0/66 4/52 12/66 13/65
ffughes %8.7 19.4 21.0
# 11/127 27/139 29/138
Roberts % 15.0 15.7
# 19/127 20/127
Butier % 2.2
McReynolds %
a Total number of cases in which Justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both Justices participated
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TABLE 4
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DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1939 TERM
Murphy %b 0.0 0.0 1.8 3.5 7.0 15.8 19.6 38.1
#c 0/57 0/56 1/57 2/57 4/57 9/57 11/56 16/42
Black % 0.0 1.5 3.1 5.2 13.2 20.0 30.0
# 0/136 2/137 4/130 7/135 18/136 27/135 36/120
Douglas % 1.5 3.9 5.2 12.6 19.4 29.4
# 2/136 5/129 7/134 17/135 26/134 35/119
%rankfurter 2.3 3.7 11.8 18.5 28.3
# 1 3/130 5/135 16/136 25/135 34/120
Reed % 3.1 10.1 16.3 26.5
# 4/128 13/129 21/129 30/113
Stone % 9.7 16.5 27.1
# 13/134 22/133 32/118
Hughes % 6.7 16.0
# 9/134 19/119
Roberts % 11.8
# 4/119
McReynolds %
a Total number of cases in which Justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both Justices participated
TABLE 5
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1940 TERM
Douglas %b 0.0 4.7 8.1 9.4 12.8 22.9 21.7 25.0
#c 0/157 7/149 13/160 15/159 20/156 36/157 13/60 38/152
Black % 4.7 8.0 9.3 12.7 22.5 21.7 25.3
# 7/150 13/162 15/161 20/158 36/160 13/60 39/154
Murphy % 3.9 8.6 7.4 17.3 17.5 21.4
# 6/153 13/152 11/149 26/150 10/57 31/145
Frankfurter % 6.1 5.6 16.0 17.7 21.0
# 10/164 9/161 26/162 11/62 33/157
Reed % 8.1 16.1 14.5 20.5
# 13/160 26/161 9/62 32/156
Stone % 9.5 13.1 19.6
# 15/158 8/61 30/153
Hughes % 1.6 9.1
# 1/61 14/154
McReynolds % 14.3
# _ 8/56
Roberts %
a Total number of cases in which Justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both Justices participated
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TABLE6
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DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCT BER 1941 TERM
Douglas %b 2.1 10.9 17.2 18.8 24.0 25.5 29.9 36.1
#c 1 3/145 16/147 25/145 28/149 30/125 38/149 43/144 39/108
Black % 6.9 16.1 14.3 21.0 23.8 27.5 34.3
# 10/145 23/143 21/147 26/124 35/147 39/142 36/105
Murphy % 16.6 16.1 22.0 18.8 20.1 31.2
# 24/145 24/149 28/127 28/149 29/144 34/109
Reed % 16.3 13.7 15.0 15.4 20.8
# 24/147 17/124 22/147 22/143 22/106
Byrnes % 12.6 11.9 14.4 20.2
# 16/127 18/151 21/146 22/109
Jackson % 14.2 18.7 19.1
# 18/127 23/123 18/94
Frankfurter % 11.0 22.0
# 16/146 24/109
Stone % 14.2
# 15/106
Robert %
a Total number of caes in which Justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of casee in which both Justices participated
TABLE 7
DISAGREEMENT RATES--OCTOBER 1942 TERM
a.
Murphy %b 12.6 12.6 18.2 25.2 27.3 27.3 29.5 34.6
#c 16/127 16/127 8/44 31/123 35/128 35/128 38/129 44/127
Black % 2.8 7.8 25.4 22.4 25.2 29.2 33.8
# 4/142 4/51 34/134 32/143 36/143 42/144 48/142
Douglas % 7.8 24.4 22.9 25.0 26.2 34.3
-#51 4 3135 33/144 36/144 38/145 49/143
Rutledge°  % 18.4 24.0 30.0 27.5 36.7
# 9/49 12/50 15/50 14/51 18/49
Jackson % 14.7 16.2 16.8 20.0
# 20/136 22/136 23/137 27/135
Reed % 15.2 10.3 18.8
# 22/145 15/146 27/144
Stone % 14.4 16.7
# 21/146 24/144
Frankfurter % 17.2
#.25/14
Roberts %
a Total number of cases in which Justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of case in which both Justices participated
d Rutiedge's disagreement rates suggest that he was the most liberal Justice during the Term. The rates are
skewed, however. C:reful examination of the votes during the final part of the Term, when Rutledge was
participating, reveals that Murphy, Black, and Douglas were more liberal
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TABLE 8
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1943 TERM
Murphy %b 12.7 12.9 11.8 30.1 29.4 27.2 33.1 42.5
#c 16/126 16/124 15/127 37/123 37/126 34/125 42/127 51/120
Douglas % 8.7 16.5 24.4 23.4 28.3 31.8 46.7
# 11/126 21/127 30/123 30/128 36/127 41/129 57/122
Black % 15.7 23.1 24.6 25.6 29.1 43.3
# 20/127 28/121 31/126 32/125 37/127 52/120
Rutledge % 23.8 22.0 23.0 28.1 35.5
# I 1 29/122 28/127 29/126 36/128 43/121
Jackson % 21.1 24.6 17.7 32.2
# 26/123 30/122 22/124 a8/118
Reed % 15.7 15.5 29.3
# 1 20/127 20/129 36/123
Stone % 18.0 30.0
# 23/128 36/121
Frankfurter % 24.4
# 30/123
Roberts %
a Total number of cases in which Justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both Justices participated
TABLE 9
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1944 TERM
Black %b 11.5 12.3 14.2 21.4 27.6 31.6 36.2 55.0
#c 17/148 19/154 21/148 33/154 40/145 48/152 55/152 83/151
Douglas % 12.8 15.2 16.8 26.1 29.9 31.3 47.6
# 19/149 22/145 25/149 37/142 44/147 46/147 70/147
Rutledge % 12.0 20.5 23.8 26.0 32.5 46.4
# 18/150 32/156 35/147 40/154 50/154 71/153
Murphy % 18.7 23.6 26.8 34.2 43.5
# 28/150 34/144 40/149 51/149 64/147
Reed % 21.1 20.1 18.8 34.6
# 1 31/147 31/154 29/154 53/153
Jackson % 15.1 19.3 32.6
# 22/146 28/145 47/144
Frankfurter % 14.4 22.5
# 22/153 34/151
Stone % 23.2
# 35/151
Robert %
a Total number of cases in which Justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both Justices participated
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TABLE 10
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1945 TERM
Douglas %b 25.2 16.3 21.7 25.4 33.3 29.8 31.8
#c 33/131 21/129 28/129 33/130 32/96 39/131 41/129
Rutledge % 21.2 16.2 25.2 26.5 30.6 21.2
# 28/132 21/130 33/131 26/98 41/134 28/132
Black % 17.2 20.0 26.0 22.7 30.8
# 22/128 26/130 25/96 30/132 40/130
Murphy % 20.5 21.1 25.4 27.3
# 26/127 20/95 33/130 35/128
Reed 10.4 17.6 25.6
# 10/96 23/131 33/129
Stone % 13.3 20.8
# 13/98 20/96
Burton % 24.2
# 32/132
Frankfurter %
a Total number of cases in which Justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both Justices participated
1983]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX B
TABLE 1
[Vol. 23
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1936 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE
Stone 94 3 3.2% -8.1%
Cardozo 149 6 4.0% -7.7%
Brandeis 144 4 2.8% -8.3%
Hughes 149 2 1.3% -2.2%
Roberts 147 4 2.7% -0.1%
Van Devanter 147 11 7.5% +6.1%
Sutherland 149 14 9.4% + 5.9%
Butler 148 18 12.2% +8.8%
McReynolds 149 20 13.4% +9.2%
TABLE 2
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1937 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE
Cardozo 49 4 8.2% +4.2%
Black 150 12 8.0% ---
Reed 44 2 4.5% ---
Stone 146 4 2.7% -0.5%
Brandeis 151 1 0.7% -2.1%
Hughes 148 0 0.0% -1.3%
Roberts 149 3 2.0% -0.7%
Butler 152 21 13.8% + 1.6%
Sutherland 55 9 16.4% +7.0%
McReynolds 152 28 18.4% +5.0%
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TABLE 3
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1938 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE
Douglas 18 1 5.6% ---
Black 141 15 10.6% +2.6%
Frankfurter 65 2 3.1% ---
Reed 135 6 4.4% -0.1%
Stone 139 5 3.6% +0.9%
Brandeis 65 0 0.0% -0.7%
Hughes 140 5 3.6% +3.6%
Roberts 128 12 9.4% +7.4%
Butler 140 32 22.9% +9.1%
McReynolds 139 34 24.5% +6.1%
TABLE 4
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1939 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE
Murphy 57 1 1.8% ---
Black 137 4 2.9% -7.7%
Douglas 136 4 2.9% -2.7%
Frankfurter 137 2 1.5% -1.6%
Reed 130 1 0.8% -3.6%
Stone 135 3 2.2% -1.4%
Hughes 136 14 10.3% +6.7%
Roberts 135 23 17.0% + 7.6%
McReynolds 120 32 26.7% +2.2%
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TABLE 5
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1940 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE
Douglas 160 15 9.4% + 6.5%
Black 162 15 9.3% + 6.4%
Murphy 153 6 3.9% + 2.1%
Frankfurter 165 2 1.2% - 0.3%
Reed 164 8 4.9% + 4.1%
Stone 161 7 4.3% + 2.1%
Hughes 162 24 14.8% + 4.5%
McReynolds 62 9 14.5% -12.2%
Roberts 157 31 19.7% + 2.7%
TABLE 6
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1941 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE
Douglas 149 28 18.8% + 9.4%
Black 147 21 14.3% + 5.0%
Murphy 149 18 12.1% + 8.2%
Reed 147 14 9.5% + 4.5%
Byrnes 151 12 7.9% ---
Jackson 127 10 7.9% ---
Frankfurter 151 16 10.6% + 9.4%
Stone 146 21 14.4% +10.1%
Roberts 109 18 16.5% - 3.2%
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TABLE 7
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1942 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE
Murphy 129 25 19.4% +7.3%
Black 144 22 15.3% + 1.0%
Douglas 145 22 15.2% -3.6%
Rutledge 51 2 3.9% ---
Jackson 137 15 10.9% +3.0%
Reed 146 14 9.6% +0.1%
Stone 146 16 11.0% -3.4%
Frankfurter 147 20 13.6% +3.0%
Roberts 145 29 20.0% +3.5%
TABLE 8
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1943 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE
Murphy 127 21 16.5% - 2.9%
Douglas 129 22 17.1% + 1.9%
Black 127 18 14.2% - 1.1%
Rutledge 128 15 11.7% + 7.8%
Jackson 124 19 15.3% + 4.4%
Reed 129 18 14.0% + 4.4%
Stone 128 16 12.5% + 1.5%
Frankfurter 130 21 16.2% + 2.6%
Roberts 123 37 30.1% + 11.1%
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TABLE 9
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1944 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE
Black 154 28 18.2% +4.0%
Douglas 149 23 15.4% -1.7%
Rutledge 156 23 14.7% +3.0%
Murphy 150 22 14.7% -1.8%
Reed 156 17 10.9% -3.1%
Jackson 147 18 12.2% -3.1%
Frankfurter 154 25 16.2% 0.0%
Stone 154 32 20.8% +8.3%
Roberts 153 55 35.9% +5.8%
TABLE 10
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1945 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE CHANGE
Douglas 132 22 16.7% +1.3%
Rutledge 134 21 15.7% +1.0%
Black 132 16 12.1% -6.1%
Murphy 130 12 9.2% -5.5%
Reed 131 14 10.7% -0.2%
Stone 98 14 14.3% -6.5%
Burton 134 21 15.7% ---
Frankfurter 132 29 22.0% +5.8%
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